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ABSTRACT
The U.S. temporary help services (THS) industry grew at 11 percent annually between 1979
– 1995, five times more rapidly than non-farm employment. Contemporaneously, courts in 46 states
adopted exceptions to the common law doctrine of employment at will that limit employers’
discretion to terminate workers and opened them to litigation. This paper assesses whether the
decline of employment at will and the growth of THS are causally related. To aid the analysis, the
paper considers a simple model of employment outsourcing, the primary implication of which is that
firms will respond to externally imposed firing costs by outsourcing positions requiring the least
firm-specific skills rather than those with the highest expected termination costs. The empirical
analysis indicates that one class of exception, the implied contractual right to ongoing employment,
led to 14 – 22 percent excess temporary help growth in adopting states. Unjust dismissal doctrines
did not significantly contribute to employment growth in other business service industries.
Temporary help employment is closely correlated with union penetration, with states experiencing
the least rapid decline in unionization undergoing substantially faster THS growth. The decline of
employment at will explains as much as 20 percent of the growth of THS between 1973 – 1995 and








Between 1979 and 1995, the temporary help supply (THS) industry grew at the extraordinary rate
of 11.2 percent annually – over five times more rapidly than U.S. non-farm employment – increasing
its daily head count from 435 thousand to 2.4 million workers.  During these same years, what many
have termed a revolution in jurisprudence towards worker dismissal occurred as U.S. state courts
recognized exceptions to the common law doctrine of employment at will.  That doctrine, which had
been recognized throughout the U.S. by 1953, held that employers and employees have unlimited
discretion to terminate their employment relationships at any time for any reason unless explicitly
contracted otherwise. The recognition of exceptions to employment at will by 46 state courts between
1973 and 1995 limited employers’ discretion to terminate workers and opened them to potentially
costly litigation.
1  This paper assesses whether these contemporaneous phenomena – the erosion of
employment at will and the rapid growth of THS – are causally related. More generally, the paper
answers the question of whether changes to the legal environment surrounding worker dismissal are
in part responsible for the growth of ‘contingent’ work arrangements in the U.S. economy of which
Temporary Help is the most prominent example.  The answer appears to be yes.
The analysis proceeds as follows.  Section 1 of the paper introduces the three classes of common
law exception to the at-will doctrine, evaluates their implications for THS and other ‘outsourced’
employment, and concludes that one exception in particular – the implied contractual right to
continued employment (‘Implied Contract’) – provides a compelling incentive for firms to utilize
temporary help workers.  Section 2 considers a simple model of employment outsourcing in the
presence of positive firing costs, the primary implication of which is that employers are most likely
to respond to externally imposed firing costs by outsourcing positions requiring the least firm-
specific skills rather than positions with the highest expected termination costs. Section 3 describes
                                                
1 Of course, employers’ power to terminate at will has not been absolute for some time.  Major pieces of federal legislation
protect the employment rights of minorities, union members, persons over the age of 40, and persons with disabilities include
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Civil Rights Act of 1991, the National Labor Relations Act, the Age Discrimination2
the data and empirical strategy and Section 4 provides empirical results.  Section 5 concludes.
A key finding of the present analysis is that state courts’ adoption of the Implied Contract
doctrine has resulted in approximately 22 percent excess temporary help employment growth in
adopting states. In addition, states experiencing smaller declines in unionization saw substantially
greater THS growth. Unjust dismissal doctrines did not significantly contribute to employment
growth in other business service industries, however. In net, the results indicate that changes to the
employment at will doctrine explain as much as 20 percent of the growth of THS between 1973 and
1995 and account for 336 to 494 thousand additional workers employed in THS on a daily basis as of
1999.
The present analysis is related to empirical work by Dertouzos and Karoly (1992) and Morriss
(1995) who explore the impacts of unjust dismissal doctrine on employment growth and employment
termination probabilities; to recent work evaluating the impacts of civil rights legislation on the
employment of the disabled (Acemoglu and Angrist, 1998), and minorities (Donohue and Heckman,
1991; Oyer and Schaefer, 1998a and 1998b); and to research on the impact of labor market flexibility
on labor force participation, employment and unemployment in the OECD (Di Tella and
MacCulloch, 1998; Lazear, 1980).  Segal and Sullivan (1997a) provide a comprehensive discussion
of the growth of THS, Morriss (1995) offers a thorough review of case law impacting employment at
will, and Epstein (1984) presents the major legal and economic arguments supporting the at-will
doctrine.  Lee (1996) and Segal and Sullivan (1997a) suggest a possible causal connection between
the growth of THS and the decline of employment at will but do not investigate the question
empirically. In independent contemporaneous work, Miles (forthcoming) explores the impact of
common law exceptions to employment at will on a variety of labor market aggregates and reports
                                                                                                                                                            
in Employment Act of 1967, and the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1992.3
results for temporary help employment that are largely consistent with those presented here.
2
1.  The decline of employment at will
The employment at will doctrine was most famously articulated by the Tennessee Supreme Court
in 1884 which wrote:
“Men must be left, without interference to buy and sell where they please, and to
discharge or retain employees at-will for good cause or for no cause, or even for bad
cause without thereby being guilty of an unlawful act per se.” (Payne v. Western &
Atlantic Railroad, Tennessee 1884).
Though largely uncontroversial at the turn of the century (Morriss, 1994), the judicial consensus
behind the at-will doctrine eroded rapidly beginning with the 1967 publication of an extraordinarily
influential law review article by Lawrence Blades. Prior this time, only one state (California in 1959)
had recognized an exception to employment at will.  But in the subsequent two decades, 44
additional states recognized exceptions as is shown in Figure 2 and documented in Table 1.  By 1992,
46 of 50 states had amended the at-will doctrine, in 45 of these cases judicially and in one case
legislatively.
3  The tenor of these judicial decisions is exemplified in a court opinion from the 1985
Texas case of Sabine Pilots, Inc. v. Hauck.
Absolute employment at will is a relic of early industrial times, conjuring up visions
of the sweat shops described by Charles Dickens and his contemporaries. The
doctrine belongs in a museum, not in our law.”
By the early 1990’s, state courts had recognized three common law exceptions to the at-will
relationship: breach of an implied contractual right to continued employment, terminations contrary
to public policy, and violations of an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
4 For reasons
                                                
2 Miles reports a significant impact of both the Implied Contract and Implied Covenant doctrines on temporary help employment,
although it is shown below that only the first of these correlations appears to be causal.  Miles does not report the impact of
unionization on THS nor estimate to what extent the growth of THS is explained by unjust dismissal laws.  Another significant
difference with the present paper is that Miles does not consider the substantive economic or legal reasons why firms outsource
employment nor why the Implied Contract doctrine apart from other common law exceptions is relevant to outsourcing.
3 Montana is the one state that adopted a statute specifically defining a default employment contract other than employment at
will, the Montana Wrongful Discharge from Employment Act of 1987.  Interestingly, this legislative action may have been a
response to a particularly broad incursion into the at-will doctrine by the Montana courts (cf., Krueger, 1991; Morriss, 1995).
4 Dertouzos and Karoly (1992) make a further distinction between so-called ‘narrow’ and ‘broad’ public policy exceptions, i.e.,
those that are tightly tethered to a specific statute of public policy versus those that hinge only on an amorphous conception of the4
discussed below, only the first of these exceptions is likely to be relevant to the outsourcing of
employment.
A.  The Implied Contract Exception to employment at will
A landmark decision in the recent erosion of employment at will is the 1980 case of Toussaint v.
Blue Cross & Blue Shield in which the Michigan Supreme Court held that an employer’s indirect
statements about the manner in which termination decisions are made can imply legally binding
employment contracts.
5 In Toussaint, the plaintiff successfully sued for breach of contract by citing
an internal personnel policy handbook indicating that it was Blue Cross’ policy to terminate
employees only for just cause.  Although Toussaint was unaware of the handbook when hired, the
court held that the handbook implied a binding contract. Courts in 23 other states issued similar
decisions over the next 5 years. An equally influential 1981 California case, Pugh v. See’s Candies,
further expanded the Implied Contract notion by finding that workers are entitled to ongoing
employment even in the absence of written or indirect statements if contractual rights are implied via
the context of the employment relationship.  This context may include for example longevity of
service, a history of promotion or salary increases, general company policies as exemplified by
treatment of other employees, or typical industry practices. Cumulatively, these court decisions
generated substantial uncertainty surrounding termination, resulting in numerous cases where courts
found that employees held implied contractual employment rights that employers had clearly not
intended to offer.
6
Systematic data on the costs of unjust dismissal suits are sparse because fewer than 3 percent of
                                                                                                                                                            
intent of public policy. In addition, Dertouzos and Karoly employ a second characterization according to whether the recognized
exceptions provide a tort-based remedy (as is common for the public policy exception and, less often, for the implied covenant
exception) or a contract remedy. Tort remedies may yield punitive and compensatory damages to the plaintiff whereas contract
remedies only provide redress for contractual losses (i.e., earnings lost net of outside opportunities).  Although initial empirical
work for the present paper made use of the Dertouzos and Karoly taxonomy, the data disconfirmed its relevance for THS
employment and hence the results are not reported below.
5 Full citations for precedent setting cases cited in the text are given in the Legal Appendix.
6 A defendant’s attorney interviewed for this research stated that the Implied Contract doctrine leaves open “the largest room for
creativity” on the part of plaintiffs’ attorneys because the definition of what constitutes an indirect or contextual statement of5
these suits reach a jury and the vast majority settle (Jung, 1997). Among California Implied Contract
actions studied by Jung, plaintiffs prevailed in 52 percent of cases, with average and median
compensatory damages of $586,000 and $268,000 respectively. In addition to jury awards, legal fees
in the cases studied by Deroutzas et al. (1988) averaged $98,000 in cases where the defense prevailed
and $220,000 in cases where the plaintiff prevailed. Underscoring the fact that large transaction costs
are the norm, the average net award received by plaintiffs was only 48 percent of the money
changing hands.
7
Indirect costs may also be substantial.  The threat of litigation will prompt forward looking
employers to take avoidance actions such as revising employment manuals, limiting the discretion of
managers to hire and fire, instigating bureaucratic procedures for documenting and terminating
poorly performing employees, and potentially retaining unproductive workers who would otherwise
be fired. These steps while potentially costly, are difficult to quantify.
8  Additionally, since there are
no representative data available on the share of terminations leading to unjust dismissal suits, it is not
possible to compute a measure of expected direct employer cost.
B.  Implications of the Implied Contract exception for temporary help
employment
There is substantial evidence that employers responded to the changing legal environment by
attempting to ‘contract around’ the Implied Contract exception. The Bureau of National Affairs
(1985) found that 63 percent of employers surveyed in the early 1980s had recently “removed or
changed wording in company publications to avoid any suggestion of an employment contract,” and
53 percent had “added wording to applications and handbooks specifying that employment may be
                                                                                                                                                            
contractual rights is open to broad interpretation (personal communication with Barry Guryan, 01/14/2000).
7 Figures from Jung (1997) and Dertouzos et al. (1988) Table 16 are inflated to 1999 dollars using the PCE deflator. Dertouzos et
al. do not provide disaggregated data and hence these figure apply to all unjust dismissal suits rather than just Implied Contract
suits.  Both studies use California data, which is most frequently studied because of the state’s accessible electronic case
reporting system.
8 Lewin (1987) reports that managers implicated by employee complaints of wrongful treatment may also suffer diminished
career advancement, even in instances where the complaint is ultimately unsuccessful.6
terminated for any reason.”
9 Anecdotal evidence also indicates that employers began adding
probationary periods to employment contracts, making explicit their unconditional right to terminate
workers during an initial term.
In practice, however, the courts have made it difficult for employers to ‘contract around’ the risk
of Implied Contract suits.  For example, courts have ruled that employers’ progressive discipline
policies – stipulating that workers will not be fired for poor performance without first receiving
successive warnings – demonstrate the intent of an implied contract of ongoing employment.
Similarly, courts have taken employers’ 401K and other retirement programs as evidence of an
expectation of long-term employment.  And in 15 states that currently recognize the Implied Contract
exception, courts have held that signed disclaimers waiving implied contract rights do not, in fact,
nullify these rights (Walsh and Schwarz, 1996). Perhaps ironically, courts have also ruled that
probationary hiring periods can themselves create an Implied Contract once the probationary period
is complete.
10
These court decisions have not, however, extended to temporary help, which remains a relatively
‘safe’ alternative for employers wishing to avoid termination risks associated with the Implied
Contract exception. Because THS employment is by nature temporary, there is little in the policies or
business practices of THS employers that would likely be held by the courts to imply a contractual
right to ongoing employment. Nor is there any precedent for finding client firms in violation of
implied contracts for terminating workers on assignment through a THS firm (Lenz, 1997). Hence,
employers in states that have adopted the Implied Contract exception might be expected to face
greater incentive to ‘outsource’ employment to THS firms. I discuss this point in more detail below.
11
                                                
9  The percentage of firms using “at-will” clauses in employment contracts increased from 0 to 29 percent between 1955 and 1985
(Sutton and Dobbin, 1996).
10 Walker v. Northern San Diego County Hospital District (135 Cal. App. 3d 896, 1982).
11 Managers of manufacturing plants interviewed by Ballantine and Ferguson (1999) explicitly mention using Temporary
Workers to avoid legal risks. Quoting one interviewee, “We have temporaries here that have been here over a year… We’ve also
had people who have not worked out.  We’ve had sexual harrassment.  We’ve had racial issues. We’ve had some drug issues and7
C.  Other exceptions to employment at will
In addition to the Implied Contract exception, many state courts have recognized two other
exceptions to the at-will doctrine.  The Public Policy exception, currently recognized by 41 states,
bars employers from terminating employees for reasons that would contravene a statutory public
policy. Essentially, this doctrine makes it illegal to retaliate against employees for upholding the law
or exercising their statutory rights, for example by attending jury duty, whistle-blowing, or refusing
to commit a fraudulent act.  A second less widely recognized exception, the Implied Covenant of
Good Faith and Fair Dealing, bars employers from terminating employees to deprive them of earned
benefits, such as collecting an end-of-year sales bonus or a drawing a pension.
12
While the Public Policy and Good Faith doctrines may have important consequences for
employer conduct (cf., Dertouzos and Karoly, 1992; Morriss, 1996; Olson, 1997; Verkerke, 1995),
they have little relevance to outsourcing in general and THS employment in particular. The reason is
that violations of these doctrines are actionable regardless of the identity of the employer (whether
conventional firm or THS). Additionally, federal courts have ruled that staffing arrangements –
which include temporary help – cannot be used to shield companies from civil rights compliance.
Hence, there is little reason to believe that the Public Policy and Good Faith exceptions confer a
distinct legal advantage to THS firms.
13
2.  Does temporary help provide the ‘right’ workers? A model of outsourcing
with positive firing costs.
Although THS firms possess a distinct legal advantage in avoiding suits under the Implied
Contract exception, it is less obvious that they offer the ‘right’ workers for clients who wish to avoid
                                                                                                                                                            
man, you get rid of those people fast.  You don’t have to worry about anything legal.  You just end the assignment.”
12 In a handful of states, the Public Policy exception is construed more broadly to protect any action encouraged by public policy.
The Good Faith exception is also read more broadly in several states to bar all terminations that are in ‘bad faith.’
13 The civil rights case of Amarnare v. Merrill Lynch (611 F. Supp. 344 S.D.N.Y. 1984, aff’d, 770 F.2d 157 2d Cir. 1985)
established the ‘no shielding’ precedent. While the common law exceptions to employment at will are distinct from civil rights
laws, the Amarnare precedent is likely to apply. Accordingly, a client firm could be held liable for instigating the termination of a
THS worker in violation of the Public Policy or Good Faith doctrines.8
these suits. The modal litigant in an unjust dismissal suit has one to five years of tenure, is an
executive or middle manager, is over 40 years of age, and earns a median salary in excess of $40,000
(Dertouzos et al., 1988).  By contrast, the modal temporary worker has less than one year of tenure, is
overwhelmingly likely to be employed below middle management, is slightly over 30 years of age,
and earns a median salary under $15,000.
14 Hence, even if firms wished to ‘outsource’ employment
to reduce the risk of Implied Contract suits, it is not clear that they would use THS workers for this
purpose.  The model in this section explores this question formally by analyzing which workers a
firm will choose to outsource when firing is costly.
A.  Conceptual model
The fact that most workers are hired directly rather than through temporary help firms suggests
that employers receive benefits by hiring directly that in most cases offset the cost savings from
outsourcing.
15 While these benefits are not easily measured, the hypothesis explored here is that by
outsourcing employment, firms forgo productive specific capital investment that directly hired
workers would otherwise undertake. Given a tradeoff between minimizing firing costs and
encouraging specific capital investment, the model suggests that the relevant question for firms is not
simply ‘which workers sue’ but how costly it is to outsource them to avoid these suits. If this is
indeed the correct question, then temporary help appears to be a logical answer.
Consider a two period model of employment where the first period consists of hiring and specific
capital investment and the second period of production. There are a large number of identical, risk
neutral workers who live for two periods and a large number of infinitely lived firms. In period 1,
workers and firms form matches and workers sink firm-specific skills investments (as in Becker,
1964) at cost  ) (s c  where  ) (⋅ c  is a convex, strictly increasing, continuously differentiable function
                                                
14 Less senior workers also litigate.  For example, Dertouzos et al. (1988) report that 18 percent of unjust dismissal plaintiffs had
under one year of tenure and 56 percent held positions below middle management. Data on the characteristics of THS workers
are from the February 1995 Current Population Survey Contingent Worker Supplement, inflated to 1999 dollars using the PCE.9
with  0 ) 0 ( = c .  Production and wages during this period are normalized to zero. At the close of the
first period, the worker-firm pair receives a mean zero match-specific productivity shock, η , which
can be thought of as realized match quality.  For simplicity, I assume η  has a uniform distribution,
] , [ ~ z z U − η .
At the start of the second period, worker and firm engage in a Nash bargain over the wage, w,
where the worker’s bargaining power is given by  ) 1 , 0 ( ∈ β . If the firm and worker agree on a wage,
the worker produces output of  η γ + ⋅ = s Y  where  0 ≥ γ  is the productivity of specific capital
investments for the job.  If they fail to agree, the worker leaves the firm to receive an outside wage of
zero.  Additionally, if the worker was hired directly, the firm pays a firing cost of  0 > φ  to terminate
the position. If instead the worker was hired through THS, the firm pays no firing cost.
Three things about this setup deserve comment.  First, it is important to stress that φ  represents a
deadweight loss or a payment to an outside party such as a law firm and hence is not subject to
Coasian compensation.
16 Second, the sole difference between direct hires and THS workers is that
firms do not pay φ  to terminate THS workers.  While in reality THS arrangements entail other
transaction costs including a sizable wage markup, I abstract from these details to emphasize that
THS does not dominate direct hire even absent transactions costs.
17  Third, I assume that specific
capital investments require unobservable worker effort and commitment and are therefore not
contractible. Hence, as in Hart and Moore (1990) and Prendergast (1992, 1993), firms will foster skill
investment by rewarding realized productivity rather than by sharing in up-front investment costs.
B.  Wages, specific skill investment, and terminations
Since  s ⋅ γ  is the return to firm-specific capital, it is not competitively priced and is subject to
                                                                                                                                                            
15 Under the Bureau of Labor Statistics’ broadest definition, 4.3 percent of U.S. workers were ‘contingent’ in February, 1999 and
6.3 percent of workers were independent contractors (BLS, 1999). THS workers were 2.4 percent of non-farm employment.
16 Any firing cost that is subject to Coasian compensation would also be present in the wage bargain but would not appear in φ .10
worker-firm bargaining.  Nash bargaining and risk neutrality imply that the worker’s second period
wage at the current firm is ] [ φ η γ β + + ⋅ = s w . Given this wage bargain, the firm will choose to
terminate the worker in period 2 rather than pay the wage if  φ − < − w Y , realized productivity is less
than the cost of termination.
Workers choose specific skill investment to maximize expected utility, which is the difference
between training cost and expected income:
(1)  ) ( ) 0 ( ) 0 | ( ) ( max s c w P w w E U E
s − ≥ ⋅ ≥ = .
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which will have a solution at  0
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18  Worker skill investment is increasing in both the productivity
of specific capital, γ , and in the worker’s bargaining power. Centrally for purposes of the model,
worker skill investment depends positively on the firing cost. Because firing costs reduce workers’
odds of termination in the second period, they make larger specific skill investments when φ  is
higher.
19
C.  Direct hire versus temporary help
Consider a case where a firm must select between direct hiring with firing cost  0 > φ  (set by the
legal regime) and temporary help where  0 = φ . Expected profitability as a function of φ  is:
(3)   
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17 Autor, Levy and Murnane (1999) estimate that the wage markup averages 50 percent.
18 I also assume that  z s ≤ + ⋅ φ γ , which ensures that the probability bounds of the uniform distribution are not violated in (2) and
elsewhere.  This assumption can be relaxed at no substantive cost by rewriting the expectation functions with minimums and
maximums at  z −  and  z +  respectively.
19 Note that with a sufficiently skewed density function for η, it is possible to obtain the opposite result – that greater ex ante
odds of termination increase worker skill investments. For example if the probability mass of η were primarily concentrated at a
threshold value, workers might invest heavily in specific capital to overcome this threshold. Substantively, because retaining a11
which in the case of THS hires reduces to  ] 4 / ] )] 0 ( [ ) 1 [( )] 0 ( [
2 z s z E ⋅ + ⋅ − = γ β π .
Observe that φ  enters both the credit and debit side of (3).  On the debit side, φ  raises the cost of
terminating workers.  On the credit side, φ  raises the expected profitability of retained workers due
to their greater specific skill investments (underscored above by denoting specific skill investment
) (φ s  as an explicit function of φ ).  Which of these effects dominates – downside firing costs or
upside productivity benefits – depends sensitively upon other parameters: the productivity of firm
specific capital, the firm’s bargaining power, and the worker’s investment cost function. Only in the
extreme case where specific capital is unproductive ( 0 = γ ) does  0 = φ  necessarily dominate all other
(positive) firing costs.
This result is a manifestation of the theory of the second best. Because firms share in the returns
to but not the costs of specific skill investments, workers choose sub-optimal investments in period 1.
To counteract this under-investment, firms may accept positive firing costs by hiring directly, thereby
credibly reducing the odds that they will terminate workers in period 2.
20  Workers invest more
accordingly.  Firing costs can therefore increase profits.  This result is illustrated in Figure 2 which
graphs a simulation of the profitability of direct and outsourced hiring for different values of γ  while
holding other parameters constant.
21  For small γ , the profitability of outsourcing exceeds direct
hiring while for large γ  (specific capital highly productive) the relationship is reversed.
D.  Optimal firing costs versus mandated firing costs
If firing costs are profitable, then firms need not wait for courts to impose them.  Firms will
presumably make legally binding promises (
* φ ) that encourage workers to develop specific capital.
The relevant question therefore is how does hiring change when courts impose firing a cost φ
~
 that
                                                                                                                                                            
job has a rent attached, added uncertainty could induce workers to make larger precautionary specific skill investments. Because
of the unusual assumptions required on η, I consider this case remote.
20 This result is similar to Prendergast (1992).12
differs from 
* φ ?
Assume now that  ) (
* γ φ  is chosen optimally to maximize (3). In moving from an at-will regime
( 0
~
= φ ) to a regime where  0
~
> φ , consider the relationship between court mandated firing cost and
firms’ chosen firing costs,  ) (
* γ φ . If firms have already committed to greater firing protections than
those adopted by the court (i.e.,  φ γ φ
~
) (
* ≥ ), then φ
~
is non-binding.  For  ) (
~ * γ φ φ > , however, a subset
of firms will find it more profitable to choose outsourcing over direct hire despite the foregone
specific capital investment. The likelihood that a firm chooses to outsource a given job (‘occupation’)
will depend directly on the magnitude of  ) (
* γ φ .  For occupations where specific capital is quite
productive (γ  large), the changing legal regime is unlikely to cause outsourcing since firms will have
already written contracts that are more restrictive than φ
~
.  And conversely for occupations where
specific capital is of minimal import, any increase in firing costs may be sufficient to cause firms to
outsource employment. Hence, the primary implication of this model is that in response to firing
costs, firms will outsource those occupations that require the least specific capital.
22
This implication is relevant to temporary help employment because workers supplied by THS
work overwhelmingly in occupations that rely on general, interchangeable skills.  For example, low-
skilled blue collar and administrative support occupations make up 63 percent of temporary help
employment versus 30 percent of overall employment.
23  And even among white collar occupations,
Temporary Workers are predominantly found in technical, computer, and medical occupations (such
as nursing) where again skills are quite general (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 1996, Table 2).  Hence,
although temporary help workers are quite dissimilar from the typical plaintiffs in unjust dismissal
                                                                                                                                                            
21 The following parameter values are used:  2 and , 1 . , 5 . 0 ) ( , 15 .
2 = = = = z s s c β φ .
22 If firing costs are also increasing in γ , then the relative profitability of outsourcing high versus low γ workers will depend on
whether the marginal profitability of specific capital investment rises more quickly or more slowly than does the marginal firing
cost.
23 Figures are from Cohany (1998), Table 6 for Operators, Fabricators and Laborers and Administrative Support, Including13
lawsuits, this fact is consistent with the notion that employers will optimally outsource jobs to THS
firms to avoid unjust dismissal suits.
24 It therefore appears plausible that state-level demand for
temporary help workers will grow in response to the adoption of an Implied Contract exception.
3.  Empirical Framework and Data
A.  Empirical framework
Figure 3 presents the time series of U.S. states recognizing common law exceptions to
employment at will between 1979 and 1995 alongside a plot of the unweighted average log size of
THS employment in each state relative to 1979 after adjusting for state employment growth. The
figure reveals a striking similarity in the movements of the two series, particularly after 1983. Of
course, this relationship may not be causal. By exploiting the fact that the common law exceptions
are adopted in different states and years, I attempt to assess their causal impact by testing whether
THS grew relatively more in adopting states.  Specifically, I estimate differences-in-difference
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where the dependent variable is log temporary help employment in state (j) and year (t).  In addition
to dummies for adoption of common law exceptions, all estimates include a vector of state dummies
j µ  that control for mean differences in THS employment across states, and year dummies  j τ  that
control for THS growth common to all states. Some models also control for state non-farm
employment, labor force demographics, linear and/or quadratic state time trends, and region by year
                                                                                                                                                            
Clerical occupations.
24 Consistent with this implication, Kahn (forthcoming) in a study of the consequences of temporary help outsourcing for
productivity writes, “In their decisions about the level of temp use, managers were extremely aware of the kinds of jobs where
temps were useful and the kind of jobs where this was not the case.  For instance, one manager noted, ‘Temps can describe the
products we sell and take orders, but we would never hire a temp to handle customers unsatisfied with the service.’  Managers
also knew that when company-specific knowledge and experience were needed for the job, temps were inappropriate …When
only a modest amount of firm-specific experience was necessary, companies’ policies made sure that the temps were well versed
in the institutional knowledge and firms’ computer systems by using the same temps repeatedly.”  Hence, companies using THS
appear to take the consequences for specific capital development seriously.14
dummy variables.  Data sources are discussed below.
In applying the difference-in-difference framework to the data, it is important to consider
carefully the ‘experiment’ created by these court decisions.  In the ideal case, the court decisions
would be independent, random events that varied in timing and had no spillover effects to non-
adopting states.  Assuming further that the ‘treatment effect’ of the common law exceptions was
constant, equation (e1) if correctly specified would provide an unbiased estimate of δ .
25
The present analysis differs from this ideal case. The court rulings should not be viewed as
independent events since 79 exceptions were recognized in 1979 – 1995 as opposed to 20 in the
preceding two decades.  Because a movement to revise the at-will doctrine was visibly underway,
firms may have responded preemptively, potentially by increasing demand for temporary help.
26
Additionally, if the common law exceptions led to rapid growth of THS in affected states, this is
likely to have contributed to the maturation and diffusion of an industry that was historically small
and unsophisticated (Moore, 1965). The differences-in-differences framework will fail to capture
these impacts if present, thereby understating the total impact of common law exceptions on THS.
Alongside these shortcomings, the common law exceptions have two virtues.  First, they are
discrete.  Second, because a court’s issuance of a new precedent is an idiosyncratic function of its
docket and the disposition of its justices, the timing of a change to the common change is likely to be
in part unanticipated.
27  The empirical approach will therefore identify the extent of discontinuous
                                                
25 The likelihood that δ is constant depends in part on whether the content of the common law exceptions differs among states.
Dertouzos and Karoly (1992) distinguish among narrowly versus broadly tailored Public Policy and Good Faith exceptions, and
additionally distinguish whether the recognized doctrine(s) offer tort- versus contract-based remedies (i.e., punitive and
compensatory damages versus contractual losses only). Although initial empirical work for the present paper implemented this
finer taxonomy, these additional distinctions did not prove empirically relevant and the results are not reported.
26 For example, a 1985 Business Week cover story entitled, “Beyond Unions: A Revolution in Employee Rights is in the Making”
warned that, “The time is coming when nonunion employees will no longer serve entirely at the employer’s will – the so-called
employment-at-will doctrine that has prevailed in the U.S. since the late 1800s.  Slowly but inexorably, judicial and legislative
law is recognizing that even nonunion employees have an implicit employment contract that is enforceable in the courts” (Hoerr
et al., 1985, p. 73).
27 In their study of the impact of the decline of employment at will on state employment growth, Dertouzos and Karoly’s (1992)
attempt to instrument for the adoption of common law exceptions using measures of states’ legal and political climate.  While
these factors may influence the probability of an adoption, the assumption that they are otherwise orthogonal to labor market
conditions is suspect.  Accordingly, I do not attempt such an instrumental variables strategy here.15
changes in THS employment induced by unanticipated changes in the common law.
B.  Data sources
To create a time series of state level THS and other business service industry employment, I use
data from the Census Bureau’s County Business Patterns (CBP) files for the years 1979 – 1995.
These data, collected annually from a theoretically complete universe of U.S. employers, provide a
count of the total number of workers on THS payrolls during the month of March in each state and
year.  The CBP data do not distinguish between temporary and permanent employees of THS
establishments and hence line staff are included in these counts although their employment share is
likely to be small. The 1987 revision to the Standard Industrial Classification System (SIC) expanded
the Temporary Help Supply Services industry (7362) to a slightly broader aggregate, Personnel
Supply Services (7363). To the degree that this expansion is uniform across states, it will be absorbed
by year effects.
As control variables for the THS employment equations, I use state level non-farm employment
counts drawn from the BLS State and Area Employment Statistics. I use the Outgoing Rotation
Group (ORG) files of the Current Population Survey (CPS) for 1979 – 1995 to create demographic
controls for summary characteristics of the labor force in each state and year including education,
gender, age, marital status, and industry employment composition in 1-digit CIC industries. For
estimates of unionization, I use the CPS ORG for years 1983 – 1995 and data from Troy and Sheflin
(1985) for the years 1980 and 1982.
To characterize the state-by-year time series of exceptions to employment at will, I rely on
Morriss (1995) who characterizes the relevant case law to 1989. For subsequent years I combine
information from the Bureau of National Affairs (1997) and Postic (1994). The cases cited for each
exception are found in the Legal Appendix. The reader should be aware that characterizing the status
of the common law is an inexact science and, to mitigate concerns about subjectivity, all of the
results presented below were also estimated using the characterization developed by Dertouzos and16
Karoly (1992). The findings are neither qualitatively nor (substantially) quantitatively affected by the
use of this alternative characterization.
Because data on THS employment is assembled from complete establishment counts and hence
do not contain systematically heteroskedastic measurement error, estimates found in the body of the
paper are unweighted. Estimates that use state mean employment as weights, found in Appendix
Tables A1 and A2, are closely comparable to unweighted estimates and are discussed briefly in the
text.
28
4.  Empirical results
A.  Initial estimates
Summary data on THS employment by region and year are found in Table 2 and initial estimates
of equation (e1) are found in Table 3.  Each column presents a regression of the log of state THS
employment on state and time dummies, state linear time trends (in even-numbered columns), and an
indicator variables for the three common law exceptions, equal to one if an exception is present in a
given state and year and zero otherwise. The first two columns contain the estimated impact of the
Implied Contract exception on THS employment.  The coefficient of 0.112 in column (1) indicates
that after removing mean state THS levels and common year effects, THS employment grew by
approximately 11.2 log points more in states adopting the Implied Contract exception than in non-
adopting states. The second column adds 50 state specific time trends to the model, increasing the
point estimate slightly to 13.6 log points and reducing the standard error considerably.  An F-test of
the hypothesis that the state trends are jointly zero is strongly rejected by the data and hence I employ
these linear trends in most specifications.
                                                
28 Since the empirical objective is to estimate the average treatment effect of common law exceptions on THS in percentage
terms, there is also no a priori reason to place more weight on larger states. All models are estimated by OLS using Huber-White
robust standard errors that are heteroskedasticity consistent but do not account for potential serial correlation in the residuals. In
Appendix tables A2 columns (3) – (6), I present estimates of detailed models using a maximum likelihood GEE estimator that
explicitly incorporates an AR1 error process (Liang and Zeger, 1986).  After conditioning on state log employment and state time
linear trends, the serial correlation in the state residuals is estimated to be 0.2 – 0.4, which is not large.  Accordingly, the OLS and17
Comparable models estimated with the Public Policy and Good Faith exceptions are found in
columns (3) – (6).  Although both common law exceptions appear initally to contribute to the growth
of THS, each point estimate becomes insignificantly negative once state trends are included.  It
appears that both the Public Policy and Good Faith exceptions were adopted in states where THS was
already growing rapidly.
The last two columns of Table 3 estimate the impact of the three exceptions simultaneously. The
point estimate for each common law exception is only minimally affected by the inclusion of the
others. The Implied Contract exception remains robust with a coefficient of 13.7 log points.  The
Public Policy and Good Faith exceptions are again insignificant once state trends are accounted for.
Because these doctrines remain insignificant in the remainder of the analysis, they are not reported in
subsequent tables although they are always included in regression models.
B.  Controlling for other covariates
The previous estimates employ only the sparsest controls.  In this section, I test the robustness of
the results by controlling for a richer set of covariates including state employment, quadratic state
time trends, region by year effects, and labor force demographics. Estimates are found in Table 4.
A first specification check addresses the concern that the states that adopted the Implied Contract
were simply those undergoing faster employment growth.  This would be true if courts in states with
robust economies were particularly inclined to ‘liberalize’ the employment regime.
29  Column (1) of
Table 4 adds a control for the log of state non-farm employment to the baseline specification, which
obtains a coefficient of 1.5 conditional on trend. Consistent with Segal and Sullivan (1995) who
report that THS employment is highly procyclical, the point estimate indicates that THS employment
grew or contracted about 50 percent faster than overall employment within states on a year to year
                                                                                                                                                            
GEE estimates provide similar point estimates and standard errors, and I limit the discussion in the text to the OLS results.
29 The figures in Tables 1 and 2 cast initial doubt on this possibility, however, since Southern states were the last and least likely
to adopt common law exceptions and yet these states grew persistently faster than the U.S. average throughout the post-war
period (Katz and Blanchard, 1992).18
basis.
30 In columns (4) through (6), I add controls for quadratic state time trends and interactions
between year dummies and indicators for each of the nine census regions that allow state THS
employment to trend non-linearly and also absorb region-specific shocks.  The Implied Contract
coefficient is largely insensitive to these additional controls.
To explore whether the estimates are driven by demographic changes in the labor force, I include
in columns (5) – (7) detailed state demographic variables that measure the fraction of the labor force
in the following groups:
 high school graduate, some college, greater than college; female, married,
married and female; black, and other race; and age 16 – 24, and 55 plus.
31  Consistent with the
demographics composition of temporary help employment (Cohany, 1998), there is a substantial
correlation between the growth of THS and increases in the labor force shares of high school
graduates, some-college attendees and females, and a negative correlation with the shares of blacks.
Subsequent columns add quadratic time trends and region by year dummies. In column (5), the base
specification augmented with demographic controls, the estimated impact of the Implied Contract
exception on THS employment is 13.3 log points.  The final column yields a point estimate of 14.1
log points which is highly significant despite the inclusion of approximately 300 covariates.
Estimates of these models that use average state employment as weights are found in Appendix
Table A1.  These models also find a robustly significant effect of the Implied Contract exception on
THS growth.  In the base specification, Column (2), the point estimate is 7.1 log points as compared
to 14.8 log point for the unweighted estimate.  When labor force demographics, region by year
dummies, and quadratic state time trends are included, the point estimate increases to 9.3 log points
as compared to 14.1 log points for the unweighted estimate.
                                                
30 One can reject that the THS employment/Overall employment elasticity is equal to 1.0 at the 5 percent level. Although the non-
farm employment measure also includes THS employment, THS is a small component (0.2 to 2 percent) of the total and
subtracting it from the non-farm employment measure has no discernable impact on the point estimates.
31 The omitted groups is white, male, high school dropouts, ages 25 – 54. The labor force sample includes both employed and
unemployed workers.19
C.  Estimates by region and time period
Because the many court decisions altering the common law provide multiple ‘experiments,’ one
can usefully subdivide the data to provide a consistency check on the estimates. Two such tests are
discussed here.  Table 5 presents estimates of the baseline model using state level data subdivided
into 3 four-year intervals over 1979 – 1991.
32  To alleviate concern about non-independence of the
outcome variable over short time spans, I estimate the models using observations at one, two, and
four year frequencies. The point estimates in Table 5 present a highly consistent picture: the Implied
Contract coefficient is positive in each case and generally in the range of 7 to 20 log points.
Estimates are slightly less stable at four-year intervals. The Public Policy and Good Faith exceptions
(not tabulated) again present no clear pattern.  In Appendix Table A2, I provide estimates of the base
specification for each of the nine geographic Census regions.  These estimates are reasonably stable
across Census regions: positive in 8 of 9 regions, and in the range of 6 to 17 log points in 6 of these.
33
D.  Inferring causality via the timing of common law changes
The discrete specification above provides no sense of the dynamics of common law adoption and
THS employment: how quickly employment grows after an exception is adopted and whether this
impact accelerates, stabilizes, or mean reverts.  If it were the case that temporary help employment
growth lead the adoption of exceptions rather than vice versa, the previous estimates would obscure
this reverse causality.  To explore these dynamics, Table 6 provides estimates of a subset of the
models in Table 4 that include leads and lags of the Implied Contract exception.  Specifically, I add
indicator variables for one and two years before adoption, years zero through three after adoption,
and year four forward. Of these seven indicator variables, note that the first six are only equal to one
in the relevant year while the final variable is equal to one in every year starting in the fourth year
                                                
32 Note that no additional Implied Contract exceptions were adopted after 1989.
33 For two regions, the estimate is close to zero while for the Mountain Division, the estimated impact is quite large (48 log
points). Estimates of the models in Table 3 that drop the Mountain Division states continue to indicate a significant impact of the
Implied Contract exception on THS employment.20
after adoption.
The first column of Table 6 presents the base specification augmented with the leads and lags.
The coefficients on the adoption leads are close to zero, showing little evidence of an anticipatory
response within states about to adopt an exception.
34  In the year of adoption, temporary help
employment increases substantially by 12 log points, fluctuates between 8 and 17 log points in the
subsequent three years, and averages 10 log points in years four and forward. One cannot reject the
hypothesis that the four post-adoption coefficients are jointly equal (p = 0.66).
   Subsequent columns
repeat these estimates adding linear and quadratic time trends and region by year effects.  The pattern
of coefficients is comparable in each case, providing robust evidence that adoption of the Implied
Contract exception led the growth of THS rather than vice versa. In the preferred specification that
includes linear state trends (column (2)), the estimated impact is 19.6 log points at year four.
35
Weighted estimates of these models, found in Appendix Table A3, provide a similarly clear-cut
pattern of rapid THS growth after adoption of the Implied Contract exception. Coefficients are about
two-thirds the magnitude of unweighted estimates, yielding a point estimate of 12.6 log points
growth after 4 years in the preferred model.  Table A3 also presents maximum likelihood GEE
estimates of both unweighted and weighted models.  These models which assume an AR1 error
process yield point estimates and standard errors closely comparable to their OLS counterparts.
In results not tabulated here, I have explored more complex dynamics by allowing the common
law exceptions to take a linear or quadratic time slope and including additional years of indicator
variables.  The data reject these more complex specifications in favor of those found in Table 6. I
find no evidence of an accumulating impact on THS employment beyond four years, nor is there
evidence of mean revision in the longer term. It thus appears that the extent of the dynamics of the
                                                
34 This finding should be distinguished from the hypothesis that employers in all states increase use of THS as an anticipatory
response to common law changes. This latter phenomenon would not be detected by pre-adoption dummies unless employers
foresaw individual court decisions in their states.21
THS demand response to adoption of the Implied Contract exception is resolved within four years.
Note, however, that since THS expanded rapidly throughout this time, a constant impact of 13 to 20
log points (~14 – 22 percentage points) implies a growing absolute effect on THS employment.
36
Two further observations on this pattern of results deserve mention.  First, the quite rapid growth
of THS employment after adoption of an Implied Contract exception – on the order of 10 percent in
the year of a ruling – may appear implausibly large. Note, however, that THS is an industry
characterized by extremely high flows.  For example, Segal and Sullivan (1997b) estimate that 60
percent of THS workers leave the industry within one calendar quarter. A substantial change in the
scale of the industry therefore requires only that the exit rate decreases slightly (e.g., assignments
lengthen) or that intake accelerates.
37
A second question is whether contrary to the estimates above, one should expect the ‘steady
state’ impact of a common law change on THS to be more substantial than the near-term impact. The
stylized model in Section 2 suggests that the degree to which firms outsource employment in
response to the legal environment is circumscribed by the ‘technology’ of jobs (γ  specifically), in
particular how much outsourcing reduces productivity relative to termination costs. More generally,
it seems likely that firms facing added legal risks will alter their occupational ‘technology’ to make
outsourcing less costly, perhaps by shifting the mix of human capital from specific towards general
skills (e.g., using off the shelf instead of custom software), or learning to manage outsourced workers
more effectively.  Logically, the temporary help industry has striven to assist this effort by
developing a sophisticated capacity for training and screening workers (Autor, 1999).
38
Unfortunately, the present empirical framework will not detect this richer interplay between the legal
                                                                                                                                                            
35 Adding controls for labor force demographics to these models as in Table 4 (not shown) does not alter the results.
36 I also explored models that controlled for the fraction of neighboring states and the fraction of states in the same Census region
recognizing an Implied Contract exception.  Neither variable was significant, suggesting that if spillovers occur from the
common law changes, they are not identifiably geographic.
37 In addition, note that there are no ‘industry specific’ skills required to work in temporary help.
38 Recent work also suggests that the industry has become an increasingly significant intermediary for employers screening22
environment and the growth of outsourcing since these practices will diffuse slowly and potentially
affect all states simultaneously.
E.  Unionization and the growth of temporary help employment
A potentially complementary explanation for the recent growth of outsourcing in the U.S. is the
changing role of labor unions.  Unionized workers have traditionally received greater employment
protections than provided by the at-will doctrine and it is therefore sensible to ask whether the recent
decline of unionization has played a role in the erosion of employment at will and the growth of
temporary help. Unions might impact the development of temporary help either indirectly, by
influencing the adoption of unjust dismissal doctrines, or directly by either retarding or contributing
to employers’ demand for THS workers.
To explore these possibilities, I first estimated probability models in a state-by-time panel to
explore whether states where union penetration was growing or declining relatively faster were more
likely to adopt common law exceptions.  I found no evidence to support this notion and these results
are not tabulated.
39 I next estimated models of log THS employment comparable to those in Table 4
while including a control for the percentage of the state workforce unionized.  These estimates, found
in Table 7, provide surprisingly robust evidence that temporary help employment is closely
correlated with unionization.
The initial column of Table 7 presents a model of log state THS employment controlling only for
state union penetration and state and year dummies.  The union coefficient of 0.040 implies that for
every percentage point increase in unionization, THS employment grows by 4 log points.  Inclusion
of state linear time trends reduces this coefficient to 0.021, which remains highly significant.
Subsequent columns add controls for adoption of the Implied Contract exception, the log of state
                                                                                                                                                            
workers for permanent positions (Houseman and Polivka, 1999; Houseman, 1997).
39 Miles (forthcoming) reports that union levels have no impact of the adoption of common law exceptions in estimates of a
duration model.23
non-farm employment, and a full set of trends, region-by-year effects, and labor force demographics.
Additionally, because of the concern that state unionization level might proxy for the presence of
manufacturing which is a substantial user of temporary help workers (Estavao and Lach, 1999),
columns (2) and (6) include controls for employment composition in 12 major industries. The union
impact on THS employment remains robustly positive and in the range of 2 log points.
 40
In interpreting the THS-unionization relationship, two points should be kept in mind.  First,
union levels fell substantially over this time period, from 22.9 percent to 12.4 percent in the data, and
hence unionization does not contribute to an explanation for the recent growth of THS.  Instead, the
estimates are best read as indicating that temporary help grew relatively faster in states where unions
declined more slowly. Second, unlike in the case of the Implied Contract doctrine, the unionization
estimates do not have a clear causal interpretation since union penetration cannot be viewed as
exogenous.  The relationship is nevertheless suggestive and provides an empirical underpinning for
the visible enmity between THS employers and U.S. labor unions (cf. Carré et al., 1994; Lips, 1998).
One interpretation of this finding is that employers in highly unionized states use temporary help to
avoid union constraints on wages or management practices.  An alternative reading, however, is that
high levels of THS employment contribute to increased worker demand for union representation.
F.  Impact of the decline of employment at will on other business services
employment
Although temporary help grew substantially faster than other forms of outsourced employment,
other Business Service industries (such as janitorial services and computer and data processing) also
experienced rapid growth between 1979 and 1995, rising from 2.1 to 3.6 percent of employment
(excluding THS). It is natural to ask whether the erosion of employment at will contributed to this
phenomenon as well.  To explore this question, I estimate log employment models as in Table 4 for
                                                
40 An interaction between the level of unionization and a dummy for the Implied Contract exception was never significant and
always close to zero.24
each of the business service industries.  Before proceeding to these estimates, I note that the legal
analysis above indicates that adoption of unjust dismissal doctrines would not directly contribute to
the growth of other Business Services since, unlike THS, these industries are not directly advantaged
by these doctrines. Hence, these results can be viewed as a falsification test of the earlier findings.
Estimates in Table 8 give little indication that adoption of the Implied Contract doctrine
contributed to the growth of other business service employment.  Except for those sub-components of
business services that contain temporary help (rows (1) and (10)), estimates are primarily
insignificant and do not have consistent signs.
41  Estimates for the impacts of the Public Policy and
Good Faith doctrines (not tabulated) also present no consistent pattern.
Point estimates for the unionization variable are more consistently positive.  This variable is
significantly related to the growth of Credit Reporting and Collecting employment and is marginally
significant for Building Services employment (which includes building maintenance).  Neither point
estimate is as quantitatively large as the estimated impact of unionization on temporary help
employment.  Consistent with the earlier results, these estimates suggest that states with higher union
penetration saw faster growth of outsourced employment.
5.  Conclusions
To summarize the primary findings, Figure 4 depicts the time series of states adopting the
Implied Contract exception alongside estimates of temporary help employment for 1979 to 1995 both
before and after conditioning on adoption of the Implied Contract exception. A fourth line on this
plot indicates the share of the growth of temporary help since 1973 that is explained by changes to
the at-will doctrine.  The estimates indicate that as of 1995, 306,000 additional workers were
employed in temporary help on a daily basis as a result of the Implied Contract exception.
Extending this estimate forward and using the weighted and unweighted point estimates to form
                                                
41 The estimate for SIC 7310, Advertising, is significant the 5 percent level but is not robust to inclusion of quadratic trends.25
bounds, I find that 336,000 to 494,000 additional workers were employed in temporary help as of
1999 due to the Implied Contract exception.
42  As the lower line of Figure 4 indicates, the estimates
explain as much 20 percent of the growth of temporary help services employment over the 26 year
period from 1973 – 1999.  Observe, however, that the explanatory power of the model actually falls
in the recent period since temporary help has continued to expand rapidly since 1992, several years
after the most recent Implied Contract exception was adopted.  Hence, the present analysis provides a
starting point for understanding the recent dramatic growth of THS specifically and outsourcing more
generally but is not a complete account.
There is an irony to the findings of this research, shared with recent work by Acemoglu and
Angrist (1998) and Oyer and Schaefer (1998a and 1998b) – namely, that labor market interventions
intended to protect or expand workers’ employment ‘rights’ appear to have had unintended and
potentially perverse consequences.  Acemoglu and Angrist conclude that the Americans with
Disabilities Act reduced the employment of the disabled while Oyer and Schaefer present evidence
that the Civil Rights Act of 1991 increased firms’ use of mass layoffs as a shield for the firing of
black men and raised the earnings of experienced workers relative to the young.  In a similar vein,
the current research suggests that courts’ efforts to protect workers against unjust dismissal have
fostered the growth of temporary help employment – non-preferred jobs that offer less job security
and lower pay than standard positions.  Moreover, there is some evidence that labor unions, which
have historically provided employment protection to their members, also induce employment
outsourcing to temporary help.
It should be stressed however that the welfare impacts of the decline of employment at will are
indeterminate based on the present evidence. While the current analysis explores one margin of
                                                
42 As of 1995, the most recent year for which state level estimates are available, 75.6% of THS employment was in states that had
adopted an Implied Contract exception.  Assuming this ratio continued to hold as of 1999 when national THS employment was
equal to 3,624 thousand, the total employment estimated impact is 3624*0.756/(i/(1+i) where i is equal to either 0.14 (weighted26
response to the changing legal doctrines, it offers no evidence on the compensatory benefits workers
may have received by dint of these laws. Theory also suggests that some legal restrictions on private
contracting can enhance efficiency  (Aghion and Hermalin, 1990; Levine, 1991).  Whether workers
were in net harmed by these well meaning judicial efforts – and if so, which groups of workers have
borne the greatest burden – is a question open to future research.
                                                                                                                                                            
estimate) or 0.22 (unweighted estimate).References
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The following cases and statutes are used for the analysis.  Blank entries in the table
indicate that no exception was recognized in the relevant state and category
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P.2d 373 (Cal 1988)
Colorado Winther v. DEC
International, Inc.
(9/18/65) 625 F.





Supp. 805 (D. Colo.
1983)State Public Policy Implied Contract Implied Covenant




Finley v. Aetna Life &
Casualty Co.
(10/1/85) 499 A.2d 64
(Conn. App. Ct. 1985)
reversed 1/27/87 520
A.2d 208 (Conn.













1984) (But note that
implied covenant
exception upheld)
Delaware Merrill v. Crothall-
American, Inc.
(4/21/92) 606 A.2d












Idaho Jackson v. Minidoka
Irrigation District








Co. (8/8/89) 778 P.2d
744 (Idaho 1989).
Illinois Kelsay v. Motorola,
Inc. (12/4/78) 384




322 N.E.2d 574 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1974)
Indiana Frampton v. Central
Indiana Gas (5/1/73)
297 N.E.2d 425 (Ind.
1973)
Romack v. Public
Service Co. of Indiana
(8/20/87) 511 N.E.2d
1024 (Ind. 1987).



















P.2d 1031 (Kan. Ct.
App. 1984)State Public Policy Implied Contract Implied Covenant


















Staggs v. Blue Cross
of Maryland, Inc.
(1/14/85) 486 A.2d
798 (Md. Ct. Spec.
App. 1985) cert.
Denied, 493 A.2d 349
(Md. 1985)
Massachusetts McKinney v. National
Dairy Council
(5/28/80) 491 F.






















Ct. App. 1986), aff’d
408. N.W..2d 569
(Minn. 1987)




Mississippi Laws v. Aetna
Finance Co. (7/17/87)
667 F. Supp. 342
(N.D. Miss. 1987)State Public Policy Implied Contract Implied Covenant
Missouri Boyle v. Vista
Eyewear, Inc.
(11/5/85) 700 S.W.2d




S.W.2d 142 (Mo. Ct.






661 (Mo. Sup. Ct.
1988)







Ann. 39-2-901 to §§
39-2-914 (1987)
Gates v. Life of
Montana Insurance
Co. (1/5/82) 638 P.2d
1063 (Mont. 1982).



















732 P.2d 1364 (Nev.
1987)
New Hampshire Monge v. Beebe
Rubber Co. (2/28/74)








316 A.2d 549 (N.H.
1974)





La Roche Inc. (5/9/85)
491 A.2d 1257 (N.J.
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1985, writ ref’d n.r.e.)
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Centre, Ltd. (3/20/89)




(5/13/86) 719 P.2d 83
(Utah 1986).





500 A.2d 230 (Vt.
1985)
Virginia Bowman v. State Bank
of Keysville (6/14/85)





574 F. Supp. 318
(E.D. Va. 1983)








West Virginia Harless v. First
National Bank
(7/14/78) 246 S.E.2d
270 (W. Va. 1978)
Cook v. Heck’s Inc.
(4/4/86) 342 S.E.2d
453 (W. Va. 1986)
Wisconsin Ward v. Frito-Lay,
Inc. (1/28/80) 290








776 P.2d 752 (Wyo.
1989)
Mobil Coal Producing
Inc. v. Parks (8/13/85)
704. P.2d 702 (Wyo.
1985)
Wilder v. Cody City
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Employment At WillFigure 4. Predicted THS Industry Employment 1979 - 1995:



































































































































Share of growth of
THS since 1973
explained1970
Implied contract 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%)
Public policy 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 1 (8%) 1 (2%)
Good faith 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%)
Any 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 1 (8%) 1 (2%)
1975
Implied contract 0 (0%) 1 (8%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 1 (2%)
Public policy 2 (22%) 1 (8%) 0 (0%) 2 (15%) 5 (10%)
Good faith 1 (11%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 1 (2%)
Any 2 (22%) 2 (17%) 0 (0%) 2 (15%) 6 (12%)
1980
Implied contract 1 (11%) 2 (17%) 1 (6%) 5 (38%) 9 (18%)
Public policy 5 (56%) 4 (33%) 2 (13%) 4 (31%) 15 (30%)
Good faith 3 (33%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 1 (8%) 4 (8%)
Any 6 (67%) 4 (33%) 3 (19%) 6 (46%) 19 (38%)
1985
Implied contract 5 (56%) 10 (83%) 7 (44%) 10 (77%) 32 (64%)
Public policy 5 (56%) 8 (67%) 9 (56%) 10 (77%) 32 (64%)
Good faith 3 (33%) 0 (0%) 1 (6%) 4 (31%) 8 (16%)
Any 8 (89%) 12 (100%) 10 (63%) 12 (92%) 42 (84%)
1990
Implied contract 7 (78%) 11 (92%) 10 (63%) 13 (100%) 41 (82%)
Public policy 6 (67%) 11 (92%) 11 (69%) 13 (100%) 41 (82%)
Good faith 3 (33%) 0 (0%) 1 (6%) 6 (46%) 10 (20%)
Any 8 (89%) 12 (100%) 12 (75%) 13 (100%) 45 (90%)
1995
Implied contract 7 (78%) 11 (92%) 10 (63%) 13 (100%) 41 (82%)
Public policy 6 (67%) 11 (92%) 11 (69%) 13 (100%) 41 (82%)
Good faith 3 (33%) 0 (0%) 2 (13%) 7 (54%) 12 (24%)
Any 8 (89%) 12 (100%) 13 (81%) 13 (100%) 46 (92%)
Notes. For state law information, see Legal Appendix.
(50 states)
Count (%) Count (%) Count (%) Count (%) Count (%)
Table 1. Count and percentage of U.S. states recognizing exceptions to employment at will 









TotalNortheast Midwest South West Total
(9 states) (12 states) (16 states) (13 states) (50 states)
1979 114,458 104,436 104,921 109,119 432,934
0.66% 0.51% 0.46% 0.78% 0.58%
1983 111,103 75,833 112,026 97,087 396,049
0.65% 0.42% 0.48% 0.69% 0.55%
1987 198,893 188,531 234,238 172,437 794,099
1.00% 0.90% 0.86% 1.01% 0.93%
1991 203,493 280,296 480,752 260,625 1,225,166
1.02% 1.22% 1.61% 1.36% 1.33%
1995 352,274 570,969 970,091 495,536 2,388,870
1.73% 2.12% 2.87% 2.42% 2.39%
1999 3,623,500
2.77%
Table 2. THS employment by geographic region and year, 1979 - 1999: 
Employed workers and percentage of non-farm employment.
Notes. Sources: County Business Patterns, 1979 - 1995; BLS National Employment, Hours 
and Earnings, as of Dec. 1999.  Percentage of non-farm employment appears below 
employment count.Exceptions recognized (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Implied contract 0.112 0.136 0.096 0.137
(0.041) (0.037) (0.041) (0.036)
Public policy 0.135 -0.026 0.126 -0.023
(0.040) (0.041) (0.040) (0.040)
Good Faith 0.106 -0.071 0.100 -0.079
(0.061) (0.065) (0.061) (0.063)
State and year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State x time trends No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
R
2 0.969 0.988 0.969 0.988 0.968 0.988 0.969 0.988
Notes.  n=850.  Huber-White robust standard errors are in parentheses.  OLS estimates given.  Source 
for dependent variable: County Business Patterns, various years.  For state common law information, 
see Legal Appendix.
Table 3. State common law exceptions to employment at will
 and log state THS employment, 1979 - 1995.(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Implied Contract Exception 0.148 0.132 0.174 0.141 0.133 0.145 0.141
(0.034) (0.036) (0.034) (0.037) (0.035) (0.034) (0.037)
Log of state non-farm 1.552 1.588 1.441 1.655 2.008 1.668 1.767
employment (0.277) (0.459) (0.407) (0.649) (0.231) (0.286) (0.640)
Labor Force Demographics
High school graduate 5.595 0.078 0.124
(1.041) (1.127) (1.090)
Some college 6.385 0.943 1.016
(1.123) (1.170) (1.178)
College + 0.044 -1.455 -1.416
(1.173) (1.105) (1.284)
Female 3.093 2.011 1.976
(1.875) (1.298) (1.280)
Married 1.331 1.572 2.604
(1.773) (1.434) (1.517)
Married & Female -2.440 -3.307 -2.833
(3.096) (2.401) (2.523)
Black -3.192 -2.008 -1.556
(0.783) (0.745) (0.808)
Other -0.524 -0.141 0.285
(1.720) (1.309) (1.669)
Age 16 - 24 1.859 -0.885 -0.286
(1.259) (1.078) (1.192)
Age > 54 0.657 0.695 -2.728
(1.352) (1.006) (1.283)
Other covariates
Linear state time trends Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Quadratic state time trends No Yes No Yes No No Yes
Region by year dummies No No Yes Yes No No Yes
R
2 0.989 0.990 0.991 0.993 0.976 0.989 0.993
Notes. n=850.  Huber-White robust standard errors are in parentheses.  OLS estimates are given.  All 
models include state and year dummies and dummy variables for Public Policy and Good Faith exceptions.  
Labor force demographics are calculated for state labor force (employed and unemployed) from Current 
Population Survey merged outgoing rotation groups for 1979 - 1995.  Omitted reference group is unmarried 
white, male, high school dropouts ages 25 - 54.  
Table 4. The Implied Contract exception to employment at will, labor force demographics, 
and log state THS employment, 1979 - 1995.A. 1 Year B. 2 Year C. 4 Year
Intervals Intervals Intervals
(n=250) (n=150) (n=100)
1979 - 1983 0.122 0.073 0.034
(0.069) (0.077) (0.107)
1983 - 1987 0.071 0.199 0.259
(0.085) (0.079) (0.099)
1987 - 1991 0.145 0.089 0.187
(0.074) (0.038) (0.075)
Table 5.  The Implied contract Exception to 
Employment at Will and Log State THS 
Employment by 4 year sub-period, 1979 - 1991.
Notes. Huber-White robust standard errors are in 
parentheses.  OLS estimates are given.  Each coefficient is 
from a separate OLS regression of log state THS 
employment on a dummy variable equal to one after 
adoption of an Implied Contract exception.  All models 
include state and year dummies, a control for the log of state 
non-farm unemployment, and dummy variables for Public 
Policy and Good Faith exceptions.  Column (A) also contain 
controls for state linear time trends.  Note that no Implied 
Contract exceptions were adopted after 1991.Implied Contract leads & lag (1) (2) (3) (4)
Law changet+2 0.030 -0.017 -0.015 0.039
(0.069) (0.055) (0.063) (0.063)
Law changet+1 0.025 -0.001 0.000 0.054
(0.063) (0.049) (0.063) (0.069)
Law changet0 0.120 0.108 0.108 0.158
(0.062) (0.057) (0.071) (0.069)
Law changet-1 0.121 0.147 0.146 0.204
(0.064) (0.058) (0.079) (0.080)
Law changet-2 0.168 0.228 0.224 0.296
(0.071) (0.070) (0.089) (0.094)
Law changet-3 0.084 0.144 0.144 0.192
(0.067) (0.069) (0.094) (0.097)
Implied Contract lawt-4 forward 0.100 0.196 0.222 0.255
(0.068) (0.069) (0.101) (0.108)
Other covariates
State x time trends No Yes Yes Yes
State x time
2 trends No No Yes Yes
Region x year dummies No No No Yes
H0: Adoption(t0 - t4) = 0 0.19 0.04 0.15 0.04
H0: Four post-adoption  0.66 0.26 0.16 0.13
vars jointly equal.
R
2 0.973 0.989 0.991 0.993
Table 6. Leads and lags of adoption of the Implied Contract 
exception to employment at will and log state THS employment, 
1979 - 1995.
Notes.  n=850.  Huber-White robust standard errors are in parentheses. 
OLS estimates are given. All models include state and year dummies, a 
control for log state non-farm employment, and leads and lags of 
adoption of the Public Policy and Good Faith exceptions. Law change 
dummies t+2 - t-3 are equal to 1 in only one year each per adopting state.  
Implied Contractt-4 forward dummy is equal to one in every year beginning 
with the 4th year after adoption.  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Percent of state workforce 0.040 0.021 0.022 0.017 0.017 0.020
Unionized (0.011) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.009)
Implied Contract 0.145 0.152 0.147 0.122
exception (0.039) (0.038) (0.039) (0.040)
Log of state non-farm 1.24 0.78 1.45
employment (0.36) (0.51) (0.75)
State x time trends No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry composition controls No Yes No No Yes Yes
Quadratic state trends No No No No No Yes
Region by year dummies No No No No No Yes
Labor force demographics No No No No No Yes
R
2 0.972 0.989 0.989 0.988 0.989 0.993
Notes.  n=750. Estimates exclude years 1979 and 1981 due to absence of union data.  
Huber-White robust standard errors are in parentheses. OLS estimates are given. State 
fraction unionized is calculated for years 1983 - 1995 from Current Population Survey 
merged outgoing rotation group (MORG) files, and from Troy and Shefflin U.S. Union 
Sourcebook (1985) for years 1980 and 1982. All models also include state and year 
dummies and dummies for Public Policy and Good Faith exceptions.  Labor force 
demographics (column (6)) are as in Table 4.  Models in Columns (2), (5) and (6) 
include controls for the fraction of the state labor force in each of 12 major industries 
estimated from the CPS MORG files.
Table 7. Union penetration, the Implied Contract exception to employment 
at will, and log state THS employment, 1980 - 1995.Implied State Log of state Mean (S.D.)
Dependent variable: Contract percent non-farm % of state
Log state employment exception Unionized employment     R
2     employment
(1) All business 0.018 -0.0002 1.36 0.998 4.20
services (SIC 7300) (0.011) (0.0019) (0.09) (1.23)
(2) Business services except -0.008 0.0003 1.30 0.998 3.02
Personnel Supply (0.010) (0.0019) (0.09) (0.90)
(3) Advertising (SIC 7310) 0.057 0.0074 0.90 0.991 0.16
(0.029) (0.0048) (0.25) (0.09)
(4) Credit reporting & -0.009 0.0101 0.49 0.987 0.10
collecting (SIC 7320) (0.031) (0.0046) (0.17) (0.03)
(5) Mailing, reproduction, -0.037 0.0005 1.07 0.990 0.18
& stenographic (SIC 7330) (0.034) (0.0051) (0.22) (0.09)
(6) Services to  -0.023 0.0048 0.98 0.996 0.74
buildings (SIC 7340) (0.017) (0.0027) (0.14) (0.23)
(7) Equipment rental & 0.032 -0.0009 2.47 0.987 0.21
leasing (SIC 7350) (0.033) (0.0052) (0.22) (0.09)
(8) Computer & data 0.003 -0.0039 1.65 0.992 0.59
processing svcs (SIC 7370) (0.031) (0.0062) (0.25) (0.40)
(9) Misc. business -0.009 0.0004 -0.01 0.993 0.99
services (SIC 7380) (0.020) (0.0035) (0.02) (0.31)
(10) Personnel supply svcs 0.103 0.0077 1.41 0.990 1.18
(SIC 7360, includes THS) (0.032) (0.0054) (0.25) (0.45)
Table 8. The Implied Contract exception to employment at will, Union penetration, and employment 
in Business Services industries, 1980 - 1995.
Notes.  n=750. Huber-White robust standard errors are in parentheses. OLS estimates are given. Estimates exclude 
years 1979 and 1981 due to absence of union data.  Estimates also include state and year dummies, state linear time 
trends, and dummies for Public Policy and Good Faith exceptions.  Source for Business Services employment: 
County Business Patterns (various years).  State fraction unionized is calculated for years 1983 - 1995 from Current 
Population Survey merged outgoing rotation group files, and from Troy and Shefflin U.S. Union Sourcebook (1985) 
for years 1980 and 1982.  Counts are adjusted for compatibility between the 1977 and 1987 SIC for SIC 7300, 
Business Services.(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Implied Contract Exception 0.071 0.069 0.099 0.085 0.093
(0.033) (0.034) (0.027) (0.030) (0.031)
Other covariates
Linear state time trends Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Quadratic state time trends No Yes No Yes Yes
Region by year dummies No No Yes Yes Yes
Labor force demographics No No No No Yes
R
2 0.991 0.993 0.994 0.995 0.995
Notes. n=850.  Huber-White robust standard errors are in parentheses.  OLS estimates are 
given.  Estimates are weighted by mean state share of national employment over 1979 - 
1995.  All models include state and year dummies and state linear time trends and dummy 
variables for Public Policy and Good Faith common law exceptions.  Labor force 
demographics in column (5) are as in Table 4.  
Table A1. The Implied Contract exception to employment at will, labor force 
demographics, and log state THS employment, 1979 - 1995: Weighted estimatesNew England 0.146 West North Central 0.116 West South Central 0.077
(n=102) (0.099) (n=119) (0.101) (n=68) (0.116)
Middle Atlantic 0.000 South Atlantic 0.154 Mountain Division 0.478
(n=51) (0.058) (n=136) (0.076) (n=136) (0.103)
East North Central 0.166 East South Central 0.009 Pacific Division 0.057
(n=85) (0.071) (n=68) (0.125) (n=85) (0.100)
Table A2. The Implied Contract exception to employment at will and log state THS 
employment by Census region, 1979 - 1995. 
Notes. Huber-White robust standard errors are in parentheses. OLS estimates are given. Each coefficient is 
from a separate OLS regression of log state THS employment on a dummy variable equal to one after 
adoption of an Implied Contract exception.  All models include state dummies, year dummies, state linear 
time trends, a control for the log of state non-farm employment, and dummy variables for Public Policy and 
Good Faith exceptions.(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS OLS GEE GEE GEE GEE
Implied Contract leads & lags Un- Un-
Weighted Weighted weighted weighted Weighted Weighted
Law changet+2 -0.008 0.026 0.001 0.051 -0.010 0.017
(0.035) (0.040) (0.041) (0.048) (0.031) (0.036)
Law changet+1 -0.023 0.024 0.007 0.061 -0.026 0.014
(0.044) (0.046) (0.050) (0.059) (0.038) (0.045)
Law changet0 0.060 0.119 0.111 0.162 0.059 0.107
(0.054) (0.050) (0.056) (0.068) (0.043) (0.051)
Law changet-1 0.066 0.110 0.148 0.207 0.064 0.094
(0.058) (0.062) (0.063) (0.078) (0.048) (0.059)
Law changet-2 0.103 0.132 0.221 0.299 0.095 0.112
(0.053) (0.066) (0.069) (0.088) (0.052) (0.066)
Law changet-3 0.069 0.075 0.136 0.199 0.065 0.056
(0.051) (0.067) (0.076) (0.096) (0.057) (0.073)
Implied Contract lawt-4 forward 0.126 0.107 0.176 0.248 0.101 0.078
(0.052) (0.076) (0.082) (0.106) (0.061) (0.082)
Other covariates
State x time trends Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State x time
2 trends No Yes No Yes No Yes
Region x year dummies No Yes No Yes No Yes
H0: Adoption(t-0 - t-4) = 0 0.23 0.10 0.01 0.01 0.38 0.11
R
2 0.976 0.995
ρ 0.38 0.23 0.40 0.25
Table A3. Leads and lags of adoption of the Implied Contract exception to employment at 
will and log state THS employment, 1979 - 1995: 
Weighted estimates and maximum likelihood estimates.
Notes.  n=850.  Columns (1) and (2) contain OLS estimates with Huber-White robust standard errors in 
parentheses.  Columns (3) - (6) contain maximum likelihood GEE estimates that assume an AR1 error 
process (estimates of ρ   tabulated above).  Estimates in columns (1), (2), (5), and (6) are weighted by mean 
state share of national employment over 1979 - 1995.  All models include state and year dummies, state 
linear time trends, a control for log state non-farm employment, and leads and lags of adoption of the 
Public Policy and Good Faith exceptions.